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INSURANCE FEATURES OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWSt
ARTHUR LENHOFF
V. EFFECT OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY OF INSURER TO CLAIMANT UPON
THE INSURER-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP
A. Breach by Employer of Term of the Policy*
The foregoing analysis pointed to the independence of the worker's insur-
ance status as the element which controls all branches of social insurance.
Now, it remains to be seen whether the employer-insurer relationship is
affected by that working principle. The cases in point present various situ-
ations reducible to three types. The first two hinge upon the employer's
breach of a policy provision such as the notification clause and they differ
only in that in the one type, the employer is the plaintiff, and in the other,
the defendant. Wisconsin Michigan Power Co. v. General Casualty & Surety
Co.'- ° is representative of the first type. There, the employer, after having paid
an award for which both he and the defendant had been held liable, brought
action against the insurance company. The defense set up was the non-
compliance of the employer with the notice provision. The Michigan Supreme
Court dismissed the action. One can approve of the result only by dis-
regarding the fact that whatever the effect of the plaintiff's payment upon
the discharge of the compensation obligation,121 the plaintiff's right to be
indemnified'122 still requires an examination of the character of the notice
tThis is the second of two installments under this heading. The first part of Professor
Lenhoff's article appeared in (1943) 29 CORNELL L. Q. 176.
Acknowledgment is here made of certain printing errors appearing in the first part
of the article:
In 29 CORNELL L. Q. at 180, note 23, line 3, substitute "24" for "23" between the
words "note" and "infra"; and in line 4 of the same note substitute "section" for
"action" between "see" and "V".
In note 113 of 29 CORNELL L. Q. at 201, the first~word of line 2 should be "last"
instead of "second"; also in line 2 of the same note substitute "second" for "first"
between the words "the" and "calendar".
*The NEW YORK WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION LAW will hereafter be cited as W. C. L.
120252 Mich. 331, 233 N. W. 333 (1930).
12tSince in New York the employer does not incur any statutory obligation to the
employees by taking out insurance with -the state fund, this (first) situation can arise
only with an insurance company as insurer. See note 21 supra.
'
2 2 See text mcpra at note 23; Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Bissell, 220 Mich.
352, 363, 190 N. W. 283, 288 (1922). Cf. Note (1935) 83 U. oF PA. L. REv. 280.
(The case noted is not in point.)
For the relationship of the liability of the insurer to the insured tortfeasor, a relation-
ship analogous to the liability of the insurance carrier to the employer, see Langmaid,
Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of Suretyship and Inmsrance (1934)
47 HaRv. L. REv. 976, 1002.
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provision. THis question will presently be discussed.'1
Another Michigan case, Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. VantaggiP2 4
presents the second type. The insurance company, having satisfied an award,
sued the employer for reimbursement because the employer had failed to
notify it of the occurrence of the accident. While the court below dismissed
,the action on a highly technical ground, the highest court remanded the
case. Although the emphasis was on the significance of the breach of the
notice provision, the decision is not commendable because of its dubious
construction of that provision. From the start the court recognized the
difference between the compensation insurer's obligation to the employee
and that of a surety, considering the insurance' company no less a principal
obligor than the employer. The court correctly argued that the rules con-
cerning the right to restitution for payments made in satisfaction of debts
owed primarily by a person other than the payor cannot apply to the in-
surer's action against the insured. 25 In dealing with, this question, one has
to keep in mind that it is one thing to hold the indemnitor liable to the
indemnitee and an entirely different thing to reverse the underlying concept
and-hold the ihdemnitee liable to the indemnitor. As the court pointed out,
one may search the compensation policy in vain to find the least suggestion
of a promise by the employer, the indemnitee, tofindemnify his insurer, the
indemnitor. The court made an opening for the plaintiff by reading into the
notice provision of the insurance policy an obligation, the breach of which
would bring about a claim for damages,-2 6 and required it to show the extent
of damages it had suffered by the defendant's failure to give him notice of
the accident.
It is not so much the result as the rationale which provokes criticism.
One wonders at the court's attempt to place the notice provision in the
obligation category. According to the standard compensation insurance
policy, that provision along with many other clauses, falls within the class
of conditions.127 That an insurance policy must be interpreted so as to
12 3 Gise v. Fidelity Cas. Co. of N. Y., 188 Cal. 429, ,206 Pac. 624 (1922) (the employer
was denied recovery against his insurance carrier on all couints). See text infra at
note 131.
124300 Mich. 528, 2 N. W.. (2d) 490 (1942).
'2Thus the court qualified the rule of Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bissell, 220
Mich. 352,. 190 N. W. 283 (1922). There, likewise, upon a complaint of the insurer
who had paid the award, the employer was held liable to refund to him that amount
for failure of notice, without any discussion concerning the materiality of the "breach
in the contract" for the award.
126 Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N. Y. v. Vantaggi, 300 Mich. 528, 533, 2 N. W. (2d)
490, 494 (1942).1271n the instant case, the notice provision constitutes a subdivision F of the policy.
This coincides with F of the standard policy. It is included under the "conditions."
See HOBBS, WORKMEN'S COMPENsATION INSURANCE (1939) 664.
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resolve any doubt in favor of the insured and against the insurer is a rule
of construction not open to any objection. Aside from the parlance of the
policy, the conditional character of the notice provision has been generally
accepted as a doctrine of insurance law,128 and is in accordance with the
common-law view of the distinction between words of condition and words
of promise. 129 Finally, since it is the function of the industrial board to
find the facts which show the ocurrence of an industrial accident, the failure
of the employer to make them known to his insurer is immaterial to the
risk.130Where a breach of a condition or warranty affects that risk; quite a
different question is raised. A California case, Gise v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. of N. Y.,131 sheds light upon a problem of this type. In an action brought
against his insurer, the employer- attempted to recover the expenditures in-
curred in defending a compensation claim of his fifteen-year-old employee
who was badly hurt while operating a meat-grinding machine. This employ-
ment violated the labor statute as well as the employer's promise to his
insurer as to nonemployment of juvenile workers. An award was made
against both employer and insurer because the local compensation statute
covers lawfully and unlawfully employed workers alike.13 2 The insurer, who
had refused the employer's request for intervention in the compensation
proceedings, counterclaimed the amount of the award which he had been
obliged to pay.'1 While the lower court denied relief to each of the parties,
the appellate court upon appeal and crossappeal affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint but allowed the counterclaim. The argument advanced in the
decision goes to the forfeiture of the indemnity insurance for breach of the
promissory warranty. That the view taken by the court is open to question
is apparent from the fact that the defendant company paid the award qua
128VAXCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 915: "... (the notice) provision must be
complied with under penalty of releasing the insurer from liability." See also RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS (1936) § 260, comment b.
'
29For the exceptional circumstances under which words of condition might be
construed as words of proifiise, see Hale et al. v. Finch, 104 U. S. 261, 266 (1881).
'
3 OSee N. Y. INs. LAw (McKinney, Supp. 1942) § 150 (2). The New York law
would probably be held to preclude a judgment against the employer, for that section
is also applicable to compensation insurance. Id. at § 167 (4). Under this statute, the
difference between "obligation" (warranty) and "condition" has lost its force, since
the effect of a breach of warranty is no less dependent than a breach of condition
upon its materiality to the risk of loss, damage, or injury. There is no case in point
in New York. In Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 271 Mich. 199, 259 N. W.
887 (1935), the court without discussing other objections dismissed the complaint of
the insurer upon the doctrine of waiver.
131188 Cal. 429, 206 Pac. 624 (1922).
132CAL. LABOR CODE (Deering, 1937) § 3351.
133 Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 185 Cal. 797, 178 Pac. 896 (1919).
1944]
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compensation insurer. In contradistinction to a mere liability insurer, the
,former paying the awarded amount discharges his own obligation as against
the claimant, for the statute couples the obligation assumed against the
latter indissolubly with his acceptance of the employer's offer. And what is
more, that obligation imposed by statutory command must be integrated into
the policy issued to the employer. The contingency upon the happening of
which the insurer's duty to compensate is conditioned being identical with
respect to the employer and the employee, the payment of the award by the
insurer carries with it the performance of his contractual as well as his
statutory duty. The question whether the nonperformance of a precedent
condition would have entitled the insurance company to refuse any payment
has become moot3 4 Legalistic as the solution may appear, much is to be
said for its practical effect, for it bars a flare-up of a compensation case
which was decided and settled between two of the parties to' it, namely the
,insurance company and the insured, about petty inadvertences neither, harm-
ing the former nor profiting the latter. Where, however, as in the instant
case, the employer's omissions amount to delinquencies which affect the
risk, the insurer may recover in an action for deceit even though a recovery
in quasi contract must be gainsaid.13 5 The California case presents such a
situation because the false declarations of the employer about the age of his
employees induced the insurance company to accept his, offer.
There is no public interest in sparing an employer from liability for
damage to the insurer caused by deliberate or reckless misconduct which
increases the risk assumed.S 6 The Connecticut act, taking cognizance of
this fact, vitiates the policy as between the parties to the contract if the
employer's misstatements materially affect the risk assumed, although the
insurance carrier is under an unconditional duty to the employees. 137 Such
13 4 RSTATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs (1936) § 250, comment c.
13 5As to the relief provided by this remedy, see 5 WlLisToN, CONTRAcrS (Williston
& Thompson, rev. ed., 1936) § 1525.136OHIo CONST. Art. II § 35 (allowing an additional award under the obligation of
the employer to reimburse the state fund for the increased award in case of his failure to
comply with specific requirements for the protection of life, safety and health). Section
4553 of the California Labor Code and workmen's compensation laws of other states
provide for an increased compensation in case of serious or wilful misconduct of the
employer. Some foreign statutes go further than that. E.g., Austria: GEWERBLICHES-
SOZIALVERSICHERUNGSGESETZ (1938) § 74 (b); German: RPEICHsvERsIcHERUXGSORDNUNG
§ 903 (4). See note 7 supra.
13 7CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5286. It is well to note the difference between a
provision of this kind and the catch-all clause found in the Arkansas W. C. A. of 1939.
See Ark. Acts 1939, No. 319, § 38 (c), amended Ark. Acts 1941, No. 121: ". . . pro-
vided that as to any question of liability as between emplover and insurer the terms
of the insurance contract shall govern." Although on its face suggesting no reluctance
to aid the insurance companies, that provision remains open to a construction which
[Vol. 29
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a provision protects the compensation insurer from fraudulent inducements,
as well as from any other material misrepresentations, whether made inten-
tionally or unintentionally, or whether made prior to or in the course of
the insurance contract. Whenever a reform of compensation statutes is under
consideration, one will have to counterbalance the social and economic
incidents of a change involving restitutionary remedies for the insurer against
the increase of litigation inherent in the greater strength of his position.
Where private insurance companies are in the field, it is apparent that
reimbursements made by the employers would cater only to the companies'
profits, for their premium policy would not be determined by their balance
sheets because of the competitive situation. However, with the concentration
of all compensation insurance in one state fund, the public at large would
gain by an increase in the revenues for the fund, because the calculation of
the premiums would then rest exclusively upon its financial status. Whether
the lowering of premiums would cause the price of merchandise to decrease
would depend upon the importance of a local price differential.
B. Attempted Cancellation of the Policy
So far, we have been speaking only of employers' failings and trans-
gressions. However, not all the vicissitudes causing insurer losses beyond
those actuarially assumed can be charged to the employer. In Piscitello v.
Boscarello,1 8 the employer had expressly refused to accept the policy tendered
to him by an insurance company which had overhastily and without subse-
quent revocation sent notice of issuance of the policy to the board. It is
not strange that the company was held liable to an injured employee of the
offeree.139 Yet by no stretch of the imagination would a recovery by the
company be possible against the employer. This brings us to a discussion
of the third type of cases which center around the problem of the continu-
ation of the compensation insurer's obligation until his compliance with the
statutory requirements for the termination of this obligation. The crucial
point is illustrated by a certain group of cancellation cases. In each of them
the decision turned upon the question whether despite a failure to file a
notice of the termination of the insurance contrAct with the administrative
might prove to be a boomerang. By reading into the contract the assumption of an
unqualified insurance obligation, the satisfaction of an award by the insurer might
discharge the employer's obligations as if he had himself paid the award.
138113 Conn. 128, 154 At. 168 (1931). (Unlike the New York statute, the Connecti-
cut W. C. L. requires the insurance company to report to the authorities the issuance
of any compensation policy.)1391d. at 130, 154 Atl. at 170: "The terms . . . are given a certain fixed significance
by a conclusive presumption ......
19441
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agency, the insurance company should be held released from liability because
of the presence of other insurance covering the same risk or because of the
fact that the termination of the relationship originated in an agreement 140
or in an act of the employer,141 but not in an act of the insurance company
itself. In Arner v. Manhattan Spring and Couch Co.,14 three insurance
companies had insured the compensation risk; when the employer agreed
with one of the companies to have its policy cancelled, this company con-
sidered itself released from liability. However, the courts found against the
company when anaccident occurred after that cancellation, but before can-
cellation was communicated to the board. In the absence of such communica-
tion, the liability of a compensation insurer continues whether or not "new
insurance is provided."'143 Quite recently the insurance companies succeeded
in having the statute amended by inserting the words "provided, however,
that. if the employer has secured insurance with another insurance carrier
which becomes effective prior to the expiration of the time stated in such
notice, the cancellation shall be effective as of the date of such coverage. ''14
This change is not a material deviation from the correct conception of the
nature of compensation insurance.
Where, as in these cases, the employer had compensation insurance with
a second or third insurance company, any attempt by the first insurer, who
had failed to give notice to the board of the terminaiion of the insurance
relationship, to demand restitution from the employer would be doomed
to failure. Just as the courts held it immaterial to the continuance of liability
that other insurance was in effect, likewise they held it immaterial that
the insurance contract had been terminated where notice of termination
140W. C. A. § 54 (5). The phraseology of the statute, if taken literally, suggests
that the requirement of public notification applies only to cancellation by the carrier,
the statute speaking of the notice as if it had to be served also "on the employer.' Yet
from the beginning the courts have balked at so literal a construction. Matter of
Otterbein v. Babor & Comeau Co., 272 N. Y. 149, 5 N. E. (2d) 71, 107, A. L. R.
1510 (1936) [employer's acquiescence in insurer's request for cancellation of policy
together with an assumption of the risk by another insurer is not sufficient, without
notice to the commissioner, to relieve the first insurer of its liability.]
141 Passarelli v. Columbia Engineering & Contracting Co., 244 App. Div. 850, 279
N. Y. Supp. 713 (3d Dep't 1935), rev'd, 270 N. Y. 68, 200 N. E. 583 (1936) (since
the Commissioner had not been notified of the cancellation, the employee's rights were
unaffected although the policy was cancelled by the employer). Accord, Matter of Tuefel
v. Lido Club Hotel, Inc., 228 App. Div. 870, 241 N. Y. Supp. 795 (3d Dep't 1930).
142264 N. Y. 501, 191 N. E. 535 (1934). Hargraves v. Shevlin Mfg. Co. and Zurich
Gen. Acc. and Liab. Ins. Co., 179 App. Div. 477, 165 N. Y. Supp. 960 (3d Dep't 1917),
aff'd mern. 222 N. Y. 646 '(1918). Cancellation not communicated to Commissioner,'
although accepted by a receiver in bankruptcy was not binding on the claimant who
was injured subsequent to the purported cancellation.
143Matter of Otterbein, 272 N. Y. 149, 5 N. E. (2d) 71 (1936).
144N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 559, anending § 54 (5) W. C. L.
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had not been given to the board. Such was the case in Hamburger v. Wolfe-
Smliith,'45 a New York decision, and in Md. Casualty v. Moss, 46 .a Michigan
decision. Awards' were made against the insurance carriers for accidents
which occurred after the expiration of the insurance contracts but prior to
notification of the expiration. In each case, the claim of the insurers against
the erstwhile client was rejected. The theory of the Michigan court was that
the duty assumed by the insurer cannot be equated to the promise of a
surety,147 for it is an integral part of the insurance assumed by the com-
pany. 48 In New York, where the insurance company had raised the question
unsuccessfully in the compensation proceedings and had then taken an .appeal
to the appellate division, the board decision was upheld, primarily upon
reasoning similar to that of the Michigan court and secondarily because the
board lacked jurisdiction to direct an interparty recovery.149 The decisions
are in harmony with sound principles of quasi contract and equity. By
writing compensation insurance .the insurance company brings itself within
the operation of the statute. It becomes an instrument of social insurance,
and its obligations are then defined by the statute rather than by the law of
contracts.' 50 The boards administering the statute, if faced with the question
whether an award should be made against an insurer rather than against
the employer or against both, should give, as the Connecticut court properly
pointed out,' 5 1 first consideration to the interests of the injured person or
his dependents. Whdn one approaches the question in the way suggested by
the court, no room is left for a fixed order of priorities among the obligors.
It is submitted, furthermore, that since, as we saw, the obligation of the
employer to insure is a public obligation which is nondelegable, the objec-
tions to the insurers' attempt to claim indemnity from the employers gain
even greater potency. By satisfying the award made against him, the insurer
has not discharged the public obligation of the employer who failed to take
out insurance.
145205 App. Div. 739, 200 N. Y. Supp. 803 (3d Dep't 1923).
146276 Mich. 219, 267 N. W. 819 (1936).
147But cf. U. S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Taylor, 132 Md. 511, 104 Atl. 171 (1918).
In this case, representative of the third type, an award was allowed for an injury
suffered in a business activity which both parties to the insurance contract considered
outside the coverage, of the policy. Afterwards the insurance company was allowed
a recovery as a surety from the employer.
148276 Mich. 219, 229, 267 N. W. 819, 820 (1936).
140205 App. Div. 739, 740, 200 N, Y. Supp. 803, 805 (3d Dep't 1923).
150It is questionable -whether the criticism of the Moss decision in the Harvard Law
Review [Note (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 7061 is correct. That the statute has no penaliz-
ing character is, of course, true; but that does not disprove the argument that the in-
surance company's liability has a basis of its own by having become an agency of the
social insurance system.
l5 lWitchekowski v. The Falls Co., 105 Conn. 737, 136 Att. 565 (1927).
1944]
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An appeal to equity can meet with no more success than a recourse to
quasi-contractual principles. To give notice to the administrative authorities
of the termination of his relationship with the employer lies completely
within the power of the insurer. Obviously the Michigan court was correct
in emphasizing the absence of equities in favor of the insurer ;152 the New
York court was likewise correct in imposing upon the insurance company
the duty of notifying the board of the termination of its contract no matter
which of the parties initiated that termination.15
VI. ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, MISREPRESENTATION, AND REFORMATION-
EQUITY POWER OF THE BOARD
A. Extension of Coverage by Agreement of the Parties
As is apparent from the foregoing sections, there is a sharp dividing line
between compensation insurance and private insurance. The pragmatic
approach to the problem dealt with in this article demands an inquiry into
the function of the institution; hence we turn to the question of the latitude
of the parties in regulating that function. In the field of private insurance,
the parties' conduct and words, particularly if evinced in the insurance
policy, have been given' a binding effect. Where, for example, the insurance
company has invited expenditures of premiums by the other party for insur-
ance against a certain class of occurrences, its subsequent allegation of the
noninsurability of such events can hardly be a good defense. Let us see
whether this holds true of compensation insurance.
In Dann v. Town of Veteran, the insurance company had, at the request
of the town, the insured, annexed to the compensation policy a statement
in which the parties agreed that one Dann, the highway superintendent, was
an "employee."'T' When the highway superintendent was injured, the board
disallowed the claim upon the ground that the superintendent was a public
1-52276 Mich. 219, 230, 267 N. W. 819, 820 (1936).
153Otterbein v. Babor & Comeau Co., 272 N. Y. 149, 154, 5 N. E. (2d) 71, 73, cited
supra note 140.
154254 App. Div. 462, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 997 (3d Dep't 1938), aff'd, 278 N. Y. 461,
17 N. E. (2d) 130 (1938), rearg. den, 279 N. Y. 760, 18 N. E. (2d) 697 (1939).
It is noteworthy that although the Appellate Division reversed the Board decision,
it did so through reasoning contrary to that propounded later by the Court of Appeals,
for the Appellate Division found for the claimant by placing officers of public corpo-
rations on the same footing as those of private corporations. W. C. L. § 54 (6).
However, in analogous cases the Appellate Division (Third Department) later on
refused to base its decisions on an estoppel and took pains to show coverage of the
claimant under § 54 (6). Matter of Brigham v. Allegheny County, 263 App. Div. 458,
33 N. Y. S. (2d) 479 (3d Dep't 1942) (sheriff); Van Buren v. Town of Richmond-




officer, not an employee, and that the limitations upon the coverage were
not open to an extension by agreement of the parties. The Court of Appeals
reversed.. Surprisingly enough, New York's highest court adopted the
estoppel doctrine as its ratio decidendi.155 One may ask whether the court
would have reached the same result if, as in many other states, the insurance
relationship had arisen directly out of the statute. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that where coverage in compensation insurance is concerned the
organization of the carrier is immaterial. Where a monopolistic state fund
was the insurer, it was found in an analogous case'5 6 that the theory of
estoppel could not be applied to persons whose relationship to the principals
does not constitute an employer-employee relationship protected by the
statute. For similar reasons, courts in jurisdictions in which compensation
insurance rests upon a contract, as in New York, came to the same con-
clusion and rejected the estoppel doctrine.157
Thus, th& denial of coverage regardless of the parties' expressed intention
conforms with the tendency to repudiate the estoppel concept in the sphere
of social insurance through strict definitions of both the legislative purpose
155 Said the court: "Having ... expressly covered the claimant . .. , in consideration
of a premium agreed to be paid therefor, it [the company] cannot after an 'accident
be relieved of liability upon the ground that as to him the policy is void because in
fact he was not an employee." Matter of Dann v. Town of Veteran, 278 N. Y. 461,
463, 17 N. E. (2d) 130 (1938).156Butler v. Ind. Comm. of Arizona, 57 Ariz. 119, 111 P. (2d) 628 (1941). The
Commission had, on audit made of the payrolls of the city of Tucson, contested the
exemption of the salary paid to the city manager from the computation for the com-
pensation insurance premiums, whereupon the city paid not only the premiums for all
the subsequent periods, but also made payments retroactive to the time of his appoint-
ment. When, upon a fatal accident, his widow claimed compensation, the Commission's
defense of non-coverage, because his salary had been in excess of the maximum allowed
by statute, was upheld. Accord, Intermountain Speedway v. Ind. Comm., 101 Utah 573,
126 P. (2d) 22 (1942) (state fund, having accepted premiums, not estopped from chal-
lenging claimant's status as an employee).
157Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 187 Cal. 615, 203 Pac. 95(1922) (no estoppel of the insurance company from defense of non-coverage although
the policy expressly included Williams and the premiums were fully paid, where defense
rested upon his having been a partner, not an employee); City Council of Augusta v.
Reynolds, 50 Ga. App. 482, 178 S. E. 485 (1935) (no estoppel by a first award and its
payment from a denial of coverage in the subsequent proceeding for an additional
award, claimant being a public officer, a fireman); Parker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 174
Ga. 525, 163 S. E. 159 (1931) (no estoppel by reason of issuance of and payment of
premiums on a policy which included claimant's position and salary, from contesting
liability to him as a public officer, namely a policeman) ; Soars v. Soars-Lovelace Inc.,
346 Mo. 710, 142 S. W. (2d) 866 (1940) (widow's claim denied because of her bus-
band's having been president of the corporation with a salary in excess of earnings
covered by the Act) ; Southern Surety v. Inabnit, 119 Tex. 67, 24 S. W. (2d) 375
(1930) (insurer held not estopped from denying liability as to claimant, a receiver,
regardless of his simultaneously having done a great deal of manual' work on the
oil lease).
1944]
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and the limited jurisdiction of the administrative agencies. 158 As a matter
of fact, constitutions and statutes have restricted the duty to compensate,
without any fault-test, to the employer-employee relationship. Can private
parties by their transactions go beyond the will of legislatures and extend
the coverage of compensation policies, an extension the costs of which would
have to be passed on through the medium of prices to the public? And is
it not self-evident that the jurisdictiofi of administrative tribunals, creatures
of:legislation, cannot be extended by acts or omissions of private persons
beyond the limits set by statute?' 59 How much the social objective sought
by compensation insurance law would be perverted to the absurd with con-
sequent danger to the whole system, if premium payment and acceptance
prevented the officials from looking into the existence of an 'employment
relationship, may be seen from the operation of old-age insurance. The
recent statute's generous treatment of older people with a very few quarters
of coverage must needs put the bureau on its guard. Othervise, "the number
of those lucky people who -are getting many times as much in [yearly]
benefits as they have altogether contributed in taxes" would tremendousjy
increase. t0° Is the mere existence of a wage record and an account'number
to foreclose the examination of the actual status of the person for whom
or for whose dependents an application for benefits has been filed? It is
undisputed that not even a decision rendered on the question of the existence
of an employment relationship by one administrative tribunal precludes an-
other tribunal set up in a companion field of public insurance from an
examination of that question.' 6
158Southern Surety v. Inabnit, 119 Tex. 67, 71, 24 S. W. (2d) 375, 377, cited supra
note 157.
159Id. See note 157 supra.
'
0 The quotation is taken from the. illuminating article of Professor Edwin Witte,
The Approaching Crisis in Old Age Security (1940) 30 Am. LAB. LEGIs. REv. 115, 119.
Walker v. Altmeyer, 46 F. Supp. 790 (E. D. N. Y. 1942) is a good example. There
claimant, an employee of a law firm, having contributed from the time the Act came
into effect (January 1, 1937), attained the age of 65 on October 4, 1938, only 21 months
later; nevertheless the contributions which had been paid allowed him a monthly
benefit of $24.03 for the rest of his life. Incidentally, claimant continued practising law,
but now as an independent practitioner.
161No estoppel arises from the finding of the* Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
the effect that certain soliciting agents of the company are not subject to the tax for
old age insurance; the unemployment insurance board might regard them as employees
nevertheless. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 183, 4 A. (2d) 640
(1939). Metcovich v. Anglim, 134 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942) presents the
converse situation. A court decision concerning a person's status for unemployment
insurance was held not controlling as for old age insurance. A detailed discussion of
the problems resulting from conflicting rulings, in the same branch of social insurance
by the two federal administrative branches involved, the Treasury and Social Security
Board, is beyond the scope of this article; for this question, see Seitz, Some Aspects of




Here, again, we observe the same concept operating as was noted in the
preceding section, but in a different phase. There we saw protection given
even in the, absence of all the ordinary elements of a contractual relationship.
Here, however, despite the presene of all indicia of the parties' intention to
establish coverage, protection is denied. Conceivably, all social insurance at
present depends upon the existence of an employment relationship. Since
the great majority of judicial decisions and administrative decrees in com-
pensation law as well as in old-age and unemployment insurance1 62 have
advanced the theory of a contractual basis as the essential of that relation-
ship, a caveat must be entered. The bulk of the decisions shows that in
addition to the wide realm of undisputed employment relationships, there is
a penumbral area where the bright features of such relationships fade away,
not abruptly but in infinitesimal gradations. Their perceptibility depends
upon the presence or absence of many factors. Some weight may be given
to the fact that the payments made to a certain person. Wvere classified as
salary and were included in the payrolls upon which the premiums for the
compensation insurer were calculated. Together with other facts, it might
warrant a finding that the individual concerned "is to be considered an
employee.163 Thus, a question of fact is presented to the board as it would
be to the jury in a judicial proceeding.164
Here, as in other fields, unfortunate confusion has resulted from the resort
of the courts to the use of the panacean word, estoppel. Opinions are couched
in terms of estoppel where the factual requisites for coverage are present,
while estoppel in the proper sense points to a state of things in which those
requisites are absent but the effect of coverage is asserted. 65 Thus, when'
162W. C. L. § 2 (9) and § 3 (1) (Group 18):"... under contract of hire.. .";
N. Y. LAoR L. (McKinney, Supp. 1942) § 502 (1): "Employment .. . means any
employment under any contract of hire . . ."; Social Security Act of 1939, 53 Stat.
1365 (1939), 42 U. S. C. § 409 (b) (1940): ". . . under a contract of service . .."
Likewise, in absence of such references, the word "employment" was construed as
implying a contractual element. Taylor v. Brainard, 37 N. E. (2d) 714 (1941);
Comments (1914) 27 YALE L. J. 113, (1915) YALE L. J. 611. But see Anderson v.
Miller Scrap Iron, 169 Wisc. 106, 170 N. W. 275, 277 (1919), which seems to hold
that coverage by compensation insurance is achieved by the appearance of an employ-
ment relationship irrespective of the existence of a valid contract. Discussion of this
question is beyond the scope of this article.
163See cases cited infra ote 164.
164Hyman v. Carolina Veneer & Lumber Co., 194 S. C. 67, 9 S. E. (2d) 27 (1940)(a social security card showing plaintiff to be an employee of another company does
not rebut evidence that he was defendant's employee). Accord, Tennessee Valley Appli-
ances, Inc. v. Rowden, 24 Tenn. App. 487, 146 S. W. (2d) 845 (1940) (question for
the jury whether tortfeasor was an employee of the defendent corporation upon whose
report and payments he had received a social security card).1650f course, the jurisdiction being statutory, it is within the means of the legislature
to extend the coverage by sustaining the plea of estoppel. Thus, unjei the influence
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the appellate division in Kennedy v. Kennedy Mfg. Co. found against the
insurance company, it resorted to the doctrine of estoppel although the facts
clearly indicated the existence of an employment relationship.1 6 6 This was
pointed out by California's highest court in its comment on the decision. 67
There are certainly cases which seem to be based upon a waiver of the
defense of noncoverage. However, upon closer scrutiny, 6ne finds that these
cases involve border-line situations in which the way the parties dealt with
each other after the occurrence of the accident could, along with other facts,
constitute sufficient evidence to justify an award. 68
That estoppel is not the true basis of these decisions can be seen Irom the
test applied to them by the Court of Appeals where the presence or absence
of an employment relationship constitutes the preliminary question. Cases -
under unemployment laws supply the best examples. 169 When, quite recently,
the appellate division, reversing a board decision, treated the existence of
an, employment relationship as a question of law, the Court of Appeals
reversed. It held that once the administrative agency had found the existence
of an employment relationship, the courts could not review this finding,
the question of employment being a matter of fact.170 At about the same
time, the Supreme Court of the United States took pains to state that the
of the Parker case, 174 Ga. 525, 163 S. E. 159 (1931), cited supra note 157, Georgia
changed her (non-compulsory) W. C. L. so as to deny insurer under certain circum-
stances the defense of lack of coverage. That meant that the law raised uncovered
employees to a par with covered employees "as if [they] were subject to the Act."
Ga. Laws 1933, p. 184; GA. CODE AxN. (Park, Skillman & Strozier, 1937) tit. 114 § 607.
However, this fictitious extension has never been construed as covering non-employees.
'166177 App. Div. 56, 163 N. Y. Supp. 944 (3d Dep't 1917).
3 671n Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 187 Cal. 61p, 619, 203 Pac.
95, 97 (1922), cited supra note 157, the court said: "This ruling [on estoppel], however,
was not necessary to the decision of that case since it clearly a'peared that irrespective
of the terms of the policy the applicant was, fipon the facts, an employee of the
corporation."
'
68Treuhaile v. Quaker Oats Co., 228 Iowa 711, 292 N. W. 799 (1940) (claimant
while operatiAg the defendant company's grain elevator suffered an injury and the com-
pany recognized his employee's ,status involving compensation payments.' Not more
than one year later, after his return to work, the claimant applied for reopening of the
case and for compensation for permanent disability, and the company then contested
his status. The Commissioner, however, found him to be an employee, which finding
the court upheld).
169 Matter of Morton, 284 N. Y. 167, 30 N. E. (2d) 469 (1940) (vendor-vendee or
employer-employee relationship was in question).
17 0 Matter of Electrolux Corp., 288 N. Y. 440, 43 N. E. (2d) 480 '(1942), rev'g 262
App. Div. 642, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 972 (3d Dep't 1941) (salesman). Note that as late
as 1941 the Appellate Division was upheld when it reversed the appeal board. Miller v.
Aluminum Cooking, 283 NI Y. 577, 27 N. E. (2d) 439 (1941). But cf. In re Apfel,
265 App. Div. 899, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 867 (3d Dep't 1942), in which the court said:
"The only issue presented is whether.as a matter of law these claimants [insurance




conclusions drawn from the facts by the administrative authorities with
respect to the existence or the special character of an employment relation-
ship must be given "presumptive weight."' 71 Viewed in the light of these
decisions, the Dann case can no longer be regarded as an authority.
Yet, not only the relationship involved in a case, but also the nature of the
contingency for which compensation is claimed has to satisfy the statutory re-
quirement. Where a substantial departure from factory rules, as, for instance,
from a prohibition against the manipulation of a cutting machine by juvenile
workers, takes the accident out of the statute, acts of the insurer manifesting
his intention to compensate for that accident cannot be given any effect. 72
This is one of many instances which exemplify the importance of the problem.
Thus, the administrative referee may exercise his own judgment as to
whether the job of the employee who suffered the injury belonged to a covered
class, even though his employer answered that question in the affirmative.
Some courts, although reaching a sound result, still obscure their reasoning
by interspersing expressions suggesting that the misleading conduct of one
of the parties is relevant. The confusion is primarily due to the historical
reason that in New York (and other states of the competitive pattern) the
insurance' companies which had been active in liability insurance became the
carriers in the new field. Since courts traditionally look to previous cases,
their resort to liability cases was a matter of course. They are to be com-
mended for the skill with which they plotted out their interpretation of the
new legal concepts. As the years go by, emphasis in the opinions is shifting
from estoppel to an examination of the facts to determine the existence
of an employment relationship, a covered employment,' or a covered accident,
as the case may be. Just as the nature of the relationship as such was not
disputed in the Kennedy case, 173 neither was the industrial nature of the
accident disputed in Harding v. Industrial Commssion.174 There, claimant
had suffered his injuries while hauling hay from a farm owned by his
171Davis v. Dept. of Labor of Wash., 317 U. S. 249, 63 Sup. Ct. 225 (1942) (state
court decision that the employment fell beyond the state act reversed, upon the strength
of,the state statute and the absence of a federal administrative decision that the employ-
ment fell within the federal jurisdiction, the question of the maritime or non-maritime
character of the employment being doubtful) ; see also Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314
U. S. 244, 62 Sup. Ct. 221 (1941).
1 7 21n undisputed absence of the insignia of coverage, the fact that payments were
made to the claimant during his temporary disability must be held immaterial. Radtke
v. Ind. Comm., 174 Wisc. 212, 133 N. W. 168 (1921).
'
73 See notes 166, 167 supra.
17483 Utah, 376, 28 P. (2d) 182 (1934) (the state fund, the insurer here, fully apprised
of the facts, had paid compensation for five years, not disputing the claim in any way




employer, who was running a brick and tile business which was covered
by state compensation insurance. Hence, the decision turned upon the
question of whether claimant's work was agricultural or industrial. As the
facts showed that the hauling of the hay was incidental to the manufacture
of brick and tile where horses were being used, it was held that his service
was a part pf that business. 17 5 The decision suggests, furthermore, the
proposition that the utterances as well as the conduct of the parties might
establish admissions of relevant facts and so have some bearing upon the
outcome of the proceedings.
B. Waiver and Estoppel
There still remains room for the utilization of waiver and estoppel. As
noted previously, the choice of the insurance carrier with whom, and the
definition of the location for which, insurance is to be carried still rests in
the hands of the parties. These are the- matters in which waiver and estoppel
play their part. What the parties to the contract may accomplish by words
written into the insurance, policy may also be inferred from their acts and
attitude. Much will depend upon the approach which boards and courts
take to the interpretation of the particular facts. In some cases they will
give full credit to the spoken words. So, in Neubeck v. Doscher it was held
that the insurance company was not estopped from setting up the defense
of lack of coverage of the place involved, although the employer had reason
to believe that the other locality was insured. 76
In general, it is easier to find illustrations to the contrary. When, prior
to an accident, the insurance company accepted the unpaid premium without
any reference to the cancellation which had been previously attempted, the
court ruled that the employer was justified in his belief that his insurance
had been reinstated.177 One can see from Barone v. Aetnii 7 8 how far such
'75Id at 385, 28 P. (2d) at 186.176204 App. Div. 617, 199 N. Y. Supp. 203 (3d Dep't 1923) (the dissenting 6pinion
pointed to estoppel); accord, Ocean Acc. & Guaranty Corp. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 179
Cal. 432, 176 Pac. 273 (1918). But cf. Skoczlois v. Vinocour, 221 N. Y. 276, 116 N. E.
1004 (1917) (long after the cancellation was lodged with the Commissioner, the em-
ployer, three days after an accident, paid nearly all of the premiums which were past,
due at the time of the cancellation. Thereupon, the company, reminding him of the
cancellation, asked for the balance. So the company's conduct could not give rise to an
honest claim on the part of the defaulter.)
177Vollpe v. Petti, 256 N. Y., 570, 177 N. E. 144 (1931) (the element which distin-
guishes this case from the Skoczlois case, 221 N. Y. 276, 116 N. E. 1004 (1917), cited
supra note 176, lies in the acceptance of overdue premiums by the insurer prior to the
accident) ; accord, Rossi v. Ciampi, 264 N. Y. 499, 199 N. E. 534 (1934).
'
7
sBarone v. Aetna, 260 N. Y. 410, 183 N. E. 900 (1933). Similarly, it was held
that collection of premiums for a policy in which the time of its effectiveness was
fixed at 12 m., when an accident occurred half an hour before, estopped the insurer
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an interpretation may be carried in the protection of the insured. There,
the policy required the employer, whose business was such as t6 take him
from one locality to another, to notify the company's agent in writing of
changes of location in order to receive'an indorsement for the policy. When
the employer was stricken by illness and failed to give a written notification,
it was held that the provision was waived beause the agent's housekeeper
not only accepted the oral notice given by the contractor's wife, but also
promised to make a new indorsement. One might say that wherever the
parties can exercise freedom of contract, they are allowed by law to alter
the terms of the contract by either words or conduct. Whether such words
oil conduct constitute a waiver is to be determined by the board. That the
solution reached sometimes appears to be arbitrary may not always be the
fault of the tribunal. Of course, the board cannot extend the statute of
limitations.' 7 9 And where the insurance company failed to plead cancellation
of the policy, this failure did not mislead the other party; it was the em-
'ployer's own carelessness that lulled him to sleep.' s0
C. Equity Jurisdiction of' the' Administrative Board
We need not expatiate further on that subject. At this point, something
must also be said about the power of the board to grant equitable relief.
Primarily, this query arises when reformation of the insurance policy is
attempted by the administrative agency. As in other jurisdictions,' 8 ' the
New York courts at first frowned upon the idea of an increase of adminis-
trative power.1 82 The battle ended with the board empowered to determine
from any equitable defense, for the employer could assume from previous talks with
insurer's agent that his business was already covered. Orto v. Poggioni, 245 App. Div.
782, 281 N. Y. Supp. 16 (3d Dep't 1935), aff'd, 271 N. Y. 551, 2 N. E. (2d) 690 (1936).
'
79Matter of Degaglio v. Bradley Contracting Co., 184 App. Div. 243, 171 N. Y. Supp.
679 (3d Dep't 1918) (employer's promise to give claimant an easy job after he recovered
held no more.estoppel than were his payments made after the expiration of the limitation
period).180Matter of Levine v. Comet Painting & Decor. Co., 284 N. Y. 359, 31 N. E. (2d)
193 (1940) (W. C. L. §§ 23, 123 and Rules of the Industrial Board 14 (1) authorized
Board to take new evidence in reviewing the case). See also Marshall v. Pletz, 317
U. S. 383, 63 Sup. Ct. 284 (1942).
'
81For example :-Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wisconsin. See note 63
mupra and note 185 infra.
182Allied Mutual's Liab. Ins. v. Interstate Cork, et at., 134 Misc. 504, 235 N. Y. Supp.
541 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (denial of motion of defendant-employer to dismiss the reformation
action in which the insurer asked to have the date of the effectiveness of the policy
changed to a date subsequent to the accident). In Soolos v. Marsh, 195 App. Div. 674,
186 N. Y. Supp. 689 (3d Dep't 1921), the court mistakenly cites Matter of Litts v.
Risley Lumber Co., 224 N. Y. 321, 120 N. E. 730 (1918), as an authority for the propo-
sition that the board has no equity power. In fact, the latter case grounded the denial




the entire controversy in the administrative action. This holding is not
only sound but also in conformity with the public policy that has led the
great majority of the legislatures in this country to entrust the adjudication
of compensation claims to administrative officials rather than to the courts.
To relegate the parties to successive proceedings, first, in court for trial of
the preliminary issue of the terms of the contract, and then before the board
for the determination of the award, would allow the very delay which work-
men's compensation laws were designed to prevent. In order to make that
interpretation -which is both socially desirable and coincident with the purpose
of the statute, it -is not necessary to depart from the ordinary meaning of
the statutory language. Even taken literally, the wording of the act seems
to be elastic enough to support that construction, for it authorized the board
"to determine all questions in relation to the payment of claims presented
to it for compensation."'' 83
The new rule, announced and framed in Royal Indemnity Co. v. Heller,8 4
has since then been followed in numerous cases.' 8 5 It has been argued that
183W. C. L. § 20 (2) [italics added]. Skoczlois v. Vinocour, 221 N. Y. 276, 116
N. E. 1004 (1917), supra note 176. It is clear that the question of extension to the
board of equity jurisdiction with respect to preliminary issues must be separated from
that concerning its indisputable power to pass judgment'upon ultimate facts, such as
causality of the accident or its industrial nature. Matter of Shearer v. Niagara Falls
Power Co., 242 N. Y. 70, 150 N. E. 604 (1926).
184256 N. Y. 322, 176 N. E. 322 (1931) ; Note (1931) 31 CoL. L. Ray. 1205 (insurer's
defense before the'board that the accident occurred prior to the day of the commencement
of the coverage while the date mentioned in the policy was allegedly due to a clerical
error, was rejected; thereupon the insurer, pending his appeal in that proceeding, started
an equity action to have the policy reformed. The dismissal of this action was affirmed
upon the ground that the adjudication of that matter was within the board's jurisdic-
tion). Although, literally taken, "no question of reformation arose" (see Barone v.
Aetna, 260 N. Y. 410, 414, 183 N. E. 900, 901 (1933), the Royal Indemnity case has
been properly cdnsidered a landmark for the exercise of equitable powers by the board;.
accord, Matter of Haskell v. Hitchcock, 262 App. Div. 309, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 945 (3d
Dep't 1941) (held that the board should have corrected the policy so that it show the
name of the contractor as the insured employer).
85 See, e.g., McMahon v. Gretzula, 238 App. Div. 877, 262 N. Y. Supp. 793 (3d
Dep't 1933), and 242 App. Div. 742, 274 N. Y. Supp. 993 (3d Dep't 1934), aff'd, 267
N. Y. 573, 196 N. E. 586 (1935). For a history of the case, see 267 N. Y. 473, 196
N. E. 586 (1935). See Matter of Gelbin v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 261 App. Div. 196,
24 N. Y. S. (2d) 909 (3d Dep't 1941).
California follows New York. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 4 Cal.(2d) 89, 47 P. (2d) 719 (1935) ; Gen. Acc. & Life Assur. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 196
Cal. 179, 237 Pac. 35 (1925). Kansas is also in line with New York. See note 188 infra.
Wisconsin goes the other way, holding that the board does not have power to reform.
Kelley v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S. M. Ry., 206 Wisc. 568, 240 N. W. 141 (1932).
In Note (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 1205, n. 4, Wisconsin cases are cited as instances of
the opposite proposition. However, these cases do not deal with the problem at all;
they only pass upon the insurance agent's authority to renew a policy and upon the
interpretation of the scope of the insured business. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Ind. Comm.,
198 Wis. 202, 223 N. W. 444 (1929) ; Northwestern Cas. & Surety v. Doud, 197 Wis.
[Vol. 29
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
possession of the power to dispose of equitable defenses and to grant equitable
relief means that the exercise of that power is not within the discretion of the
board. Whenever the facts warrant its use, the exercise of the power can be
insisted upon, for the board's unwillingness cannot affect its jurisdiction. 86
In one case the point in issue was whether a certain person whose insurance
was optional under the law was in fact insured. The insurance company's de-
fense was that the parties did not intend to contract for his coverage, although
the policy on its face indicated that'he was included. Upon appeal, it was held
that the board had improperly rejected the defense,-8 7 Conversely, where but
for the wording of the policy, everything else evinced the intention to insure a
certain business enterprise, the denial of an award was reversed. 88 From the
jurisdictional point of view, it seems to be obvious that the decision of the
board on questions of this kind, once it has become final, is no longer open to
collateral attack .. 9 By the same token, once the board has disposed of a
claim, a new action concerning any matter embraced in that decision either
expressly or impliedly, such as the question of a reformation of the insurance
policy, must run against the defense of res judicata.'90
There is one question which suggests itself because of the ease with which
an administrative board, unhampered by rigid rules of evidence, may be
satisfied of the need for a reformation of the insurance policy. Can he in
whose interest it is to leave the policy as it stands, forestall such an adminis-
trative reformation ?19  In Barone v. Aetna Life the Court of Appeals
237, 221 N. W. 766 (1928).
Missouri and Utah follow Wisconsin. Kelly v. Howard, 233 Mo. App. 474, 123 S. W.
(2d) 584 (1938) ; Continental Cas. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 61 Utah 16, 210 Pac. 127 (1922)
(insurer's action for reformation).
18611; re Gleasner's Estate, 245 App. Div. 343, 282 N. Y. Supp. 158 (3d Dep't 1935).
18Ibid., aff'd mb iwin. Comm'r v. Gleasner, 269 N. Y. 590, 199 N. E. 686 (1935).
Because the policy did not contain an exclusion of the coverage of the company president
who was killed in an industrial accident, the company was held by the board for the
payments to special funds according to W. C. A. § 15 (8), the widow having disclaimed
any right under the Act. The courts, however, held the board was obliged to "reform."
18 8 5ee also Emp. Liab. Assoc. Corp. v. Matlock, 151 Kan. 293, 98 P. (2d) 456 (1940)
(equity action by insurer against employer and workman for cancellation or reformation
of the policy, dismissed because subject was within the jurisdiction of the board);
-Walker v. Kansas Gasoline Co., 130 Kan. 576, 287 Pac. 235 (1930) (board has power
to set aside the release).
1 89 Royal Indem. Co. v. Heller, 256 N. Y. 322, 176 N. E. 410 (1931), aff'g 231 App.
Div. 812, 246 N. Y. Supp. 885 (3d Dep't 1930).
19 0The court held that even an erroneous determination by the board as to the
question of its power to reform a policy must be conclusive and a subsequent equity
action for reformation dismissed. Id. at 327, 176 N. E. at 411.
1 9 1 Allied Mutual's Life Ins. v. Interstate Cork Co., 134 Misc. 504, 235 N. Y. Supp.
541 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (action of insurer). For the requirements of such reformation,
see Lewitt v. Jewelers Safety Fund Soc., 249 N. Y. 217, 164 N. E. 29 (1928) (burglary




allowed the employer to pursue his civil action for reformation of the policy
before the courts.192 The opinion laid down two principles. First, it fully
sustained the jurisdiction of the board over equitable defenses to the same
extent as over legal defenses. Hence, if the adverse party had pleaded the
pendency of the board proceeding, the court action would not have been
entertained.193 Second, the court emphatically contradicted the assertion
of any exclusionary power of the board over equitable defenses and advanced
- the concept of a concurrent jurisdiction ruled by priority, so that the race
will be to the swift.'9 It may be inferred from the holding that in New
York, while administrative jurisdiction over all possible phases of a com-
pensation litigation has been recognized, it has received a different con-
struction from that given to analogous provisions governing other labor
tribunals, for example, the national as well as the state labor board. The
jurisdiction of the labor boards really ousts the courts of power in all mat-
ters within the jtirisdiction of the boards, so that the lack of jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of a court action. 95 The New York doctrine
illustrates the difficulty of finding a satisfactory solution of the problems
inherent in jurisdictional competition. Moreover, where the compensation
claimant does not participate in the court action, the Barone formula may
become of little importance because the judgment would not be res judicata
as to him in the administrative action. Should the board reach a result
different from that of the equity court, the former judgment would have no
effect upon the court deciding an appeal from the board, for, as noted in
a previous passage, the scope of review does not embrace questions of fact.
In the light of the foregoing conclusions one understands why the referees
hardly ever await the termination of a court action even if it has been com-
192260 N. Y. 410, 183 N. E. 900 (1933) (for the facts, see text at note 178 mcpra.
The employer, alleging insurance, brought action for reformation against the insurer,
who failed to plead the pending boai'd proceeding). Cf. Royal Indem. Co. v. Heller, 256
N. Y. 322, 176 N. E. 322 (1931), cited supra note 184.
193260 N. Y. 410, 414, 183 N. E. 900, 902 (1933).
l94It is generally recognized that in in, personam actions brought upon the same cause
'of action before different tribunals of co-ordinate jurisdiction, each tribunal is fVee to
proceed until a judgment or decree rendered by the one has become res judicata as to
the other. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611, 46 Sup. Ct. 420 (1926).
Usually, therefore, no injunction to enjoin the prosecution of the claim .in the other
tribunal will be granted. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 43 Sup. Ct.
79 (1922).195United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. Int. Broth. of Elect. Workers,
115 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (courts have no jurisdiction to grant injunctive
relief asked by a trade union certified as a representative against a rival ofganization) ;
see also Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303'U. S. 41, 58 Sup. Ct. 459 (1938); Newport




menced prior to the board proceeding. The fact ihat, as compared with
the ever-mounting number of reformation cases decided by the board, no
contrary court decision has been reported, seems to be' signific.ant. It can
only mean that the carriers, well-advised and realistic as they are, no longer
cherish any i]lusions about the prospects of getting a court decision before
the completion of the compensation proceedings, which are noted for their
expeditiousness. 196 In concluding this discussion it may be noted that, having
regard for the difficulties engendered by the concurrent-jurisdiction rule,
the Kansas courts have held in favor of the primary jurisdiction of the
board. 19
7
In regard to the extent to which administrative agencies may go in the
exercise of their equitable power, one need but look to the decisions of the
reviewing court, for it is hard to find rulings more liberal and less doctrinaire
than those of the Third Department of the Appellate'Division. 198 Quite
recently, the Third Department held that equity may relieve a claimant from
the unjust results of the statutory bar against the commencement of a com-
pensation action when the claimant has already received a judgment, and
allowed an award to be rendered against the insurance carrier despite the
existing judgment. 19 Since many states (but no longer New York)2 00 still
adhere to the alternative-remedies rule, that decision calls for a few remarks.
At common law it has been generally held that employment of one remedy
eliminates recourse to the other remedies forever. Yet, as many cases demon-
strate, equity may occasionally make an exception to this rule. Where no
element of estoppel is involved or no real choice exists, the application of
the rule becomes pointless.2 01 Is this concept of finality of election, which is
apparently embedded in the workmen's conmpensation law, not also subject
'
90 As a sequel to the judicial recognition of the board's power over equitable defenses,
§ 54a was added to the W. C. L. by N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 780. By that provision the
Commissioner may require the employer, whenever the board has repudiated the in-
surer's defense of lack of coverage, to deposit or to secure the amount of the award, so
that the carrier is relieved from any payment pending his appeal.
1 TEmp. Liab. Assoc. Corp. v. Matlock, 151 Kan. 293, 98 P. (2d) 456 (1940), cited
supra note 188.
198AII appeals taken from awards or other decisions of the -Industrial Board in
compensation cases and from decisions of the Appeal Board in unemployment insurance
cases have been centralized in that department. W. C. L. § 23; N. Y. L'A. L. § 535.
199Matter of Gelbin v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 261 App. Div. 196, 24 N. Y. S. (2d)
909 (3d Dep't 1941). The case arose many years prior to the amendment cited infra
note 200. Since claimant was unable to collect from the third party the damages granted
him by judgment, the third party having been involved in a reorganization proceeding,
he commenced the compensation action.20OAn amendment to W. C. L. § 29 (1) abolished the binding effect of a choice
between a third party action and a compensation proceeding. N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 684.
20olCf. cases cited in Note, -Election of Renedies, (1923) 36 HARv. L. Rav. 593.
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to qualifications analogous to those applied to the non-statutory cases?2°2
At first thought, one might argue that when the judgment is obtained with-
out any fraud having been committed by either party, the board has been
deprived of jurisdiction over the matter.20 3 However, further consideration
suggests that, since the relief from the fatal effects of the choice necessarily
involves a different respondent, there is no danger of a double satisfaction,
a relitigation, or an unnecessary vexation of the defendant, the very reasons
which lie at the foundation of the binding-choice rule. And considering
particularly the policy behind the compensation acts, it is a common-sense
construction that when the judgment obtained against the third party re-
mains hopelessly unsatisfied, the pursuit of the former remedy must be
regarded as no more of a bar than the deliberation preceding the choice.
D. Misrepreseiitations by Employees
Notwithstanding the large stock of curatives, there still remain iniquitous
situations for which compensation insurance, unlike private insurance, has
no dose to administer. Thus, we turn our attention to misrepresentations
by employees. Here again, the difference between what is void and what
is voidable, a difference which we have already found to be fundamental in
the insurance relationship between employees and carriers, grows in impor-
tance. If, for example, the employment contract were void because of the
illegality of the occupation, then there would be no contract at all, and
hence no coverage.204 The question whether a job which was obtained in
violation of a penal statute or an industrial code is covered might depend
upon the meaning and purpose of the prohibitive provisions. Of the cases
bearing upon this subject, those concerning accidents to minors employed
2 O2But see U. S. v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct. 100 (122) (after
the equity action for rescission had failed because of the interposed plea of the statute
of limitations, the law suit was dismissed because of the consummation of the choice).
See Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, id. at 302; accord, Schenck v. State Line Tel. Co.,
2a8 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 592 (1924) (equity suit brought after the discontinuance of
the law suit which had not yet progressed to a judgment held maintainable).
203In Johnson v. Am. Hawaiian S. S. Co., 98 F. (2d) 847 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938),
the point at issue concerned a choice made by claimant for compensation. Misled by
his employer, claimant started this compensation action, yet he was not deemed to be
barred from an action against the third party wrongdoer. Similarly, the acceptance of
compensation benefits has not been held to exclude a common-law action for damages
where the claimant was ignorant of his status, for instance, as a non-employee. Smith
v. Price Bros. Co., /131 F. (2d) 750 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).204Swihura v. Horowitz, 242 N. Y. 523, 152 N. E. 411 (1926) (employment for
handling intoxicating liquor during the prohibition era); Matter of Clarke v. Town
of Russia, 283 N. Y. 272, 28 N. E. (2d) 833 (1940) (illegal contract between munici-
pality and one of its officers). In California. however, legality of employment is of no
importance. 'CAL. LAB. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 3351. The Act extends coverage irre-
spective of whether the worker is "lawfully or unlawfully" employed.
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in violation of a statute reveal an important aspect of the problem.
For the most part the courts have been reluctant to regard these employ-
ments as absolutely void. EB'en so, in the absence of a definite statutory
mandate, the question of their coverage is far from being uniformly an-
swered. In many states the compensation acts apply only to persons legally
permitted to work, or the courts have made a rule to this effect.20 5 As a
result, the profession has been forced to search for other remedies in order
to indemnify the juvenile victims of an accident. 20 6
Another view leaves it to the minor to choose between a claim for com-
pensation or an action at common law based upon the wrong done by employ-
ing him contrary to statutory interdiction.20 7 That the separation of the
question of the industrial risk from that of culpability, which is the basic
concept of compensation law, was not allowed to stand in the way of that
choice, can be seen from the earlier New York cases.208
However, in 1920 the trend of opinions changed completely, and the courts
have followed the new course ever since.20 9 This new rule, which restricts
the minor to his compensation claim, represents a third approach to that
thorny problem.2 10 As a deterrent a sanction was added providing, in case
of transgression, for a double award against the employer alone, and not
against his insurance carrier.2 1'
2 0 5For an interesting survey of the varying views, see Humphries v. Boxley Bros.
Co., 146 Va. 91, 135 S. E. 890 (1926).206A discussion of this special problem must be omitted here. May it suffice to point
out that where a compensation act is of the elective type, a common-law action lies,
according to some authorities, the minor being held unable to make a valid election.
Western Union v. Ausbrooks, 148 Tenn. 615, 257 S. W. 858 (1924). Virginia holds
to the contrary. Humphries v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 135 S. E. 890 (1926),
cited supra note 205.2 0 7Under this view, the illegality was charged solely to the employer. Watson v.
Stagg, 108 N. J. L. 444, 158 Atl. 820 (1932). For a collection of cases, see Notes(1921) 14 A. L. R. 18, (1924) 33 A. L. R. 337, (1927) 49 A. L. R. 1435, (1929) 60
A. L. R. 847, (1933) 83 A. L. R. 416.2 0 8Wolff v. Fulton,. 185 App. Div. 436, 173 N. Y. Supp. 75 (3d Dep't 1918) (minor
may choose between common-law action and compensation claim). The case of Ide v.
Faul &*Timmins, 179 App. Div. 567, 166 N. Y. Supp. 858 (3d Dep't 1917) is not in
point, for there the minor himself claimed under W. C. L.2 0 9Espoused in Boyle v. Cheney Piano Action Co., 193 App. Div. 408, 184 N. Y.
Supp. 374 (3d Dep't 1920), the new holding was corroborated in Noreen v. Vogel, 231
N. Y. 317, 132 N. E. 102 (1921), cf. Decker v. Pouvailsmith Corp., 225 App. Div. 489,
233 N. Y. Supp. 407 (3d Dep't 1929), rev'd on other grnozds, 252 N. Y. 1, 168 N. E.
442 (1929). Consequently the common-law actions of third persons, parents, for instance,
have also been barred. Noreen v. Vogel, mtpra.
210Accord, Rasi v. Howard Mfg. Co., 109 Wash. 524, 187 Pac. 327 (1920) ; Pierce's
Case, 267 Mass. 208, 166 N. E. 636 (1929).2
nN. Y. Laws 1923, c. 572 (W. C. L. § 14a). The insurance carrier is not liable
for the increased award. Id. § 14a (2). There is a difference between infants under' 18
and over 18. See note 216 infra.
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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
Reverting to our principal subject we find that claims for damages have
never been defeated upon the ground of misrepresentations made by appli-
cants for a job, such as false statements concerning their age, or former
employment relationships. 212 This must be even more true of compensation
claims. The reasons for it revolve around the, distinction between a void
contract and a voidable contract. Misrepresentations of the stated type
r ght motivate an employer to give an applicant the job; yet it is clear that
they do not affect the nature of the transaction and its terms. Since there
was a full agreement between the parties, there was a contract.2 13 Reserving
the question of mistakes concerning the identity of the applicant to later
discussion, we may ask whether the stated misrepresentations should have
any effect upon the compensation claim if, as we assume, the accident oc-
curred prior to the termination of the actual employment. To state this
question is to answer it, for as long as the employer did not avoid the
contract of employment, the employment was being carried out, and com-
pensation will be awarded. 214 The risks resulting in the injury were involved
in the services rendered to the employer, not in the surreptitious manner
in which he got his job.2 15 But does not a causal connection between the
misrepresentation and the accident lend support to a different view? Were
not the minimum age limitations enacted because infants were more likely
212 Newkirk v. Los Angeles junction Ry. Corp., 21 Cal. (2d) 308, 131 P. (2d) 535
(1942); Ganga v. Ford Motor Co., 250 Mich. 347, 230 N. W. 159 (1930); Hart v.
N. Y. C. & H. Ry., 205 N. Y. 317, 98 N. E. 493 (1912) ; Kenny v. Union Ry., 166 App.
Div. 497, 552 N. Y. Supp. 117 (3d Dep't 1915).213For the distinction between mistakes making the contract void and misrepresenta-
tions, see ANsoN, CONTRAcTS (Patterson's ed. 1939) §§ 212-214.214Kenny v. Union Ry., 166 App. Div. 497, 552 N. Y. Supp. 117 (3d Dep't 1915)
(held, the fact that application violated N. Y. Penal Law § 939, by falsely stating that
the applicant was never employed by a railroad company and by disguising his family
status, made the contract voidable only; compensation awarded). Accord, Clifford Ide
v. Faul, 179 App. Div. 567, 166 N. Y. Supp. 858 (3d Dep't 1917); Kocilowicz v.
Tonawanda Corrugated Box Co., 252 App. Div. 716, 298 N. Y. Supp. 844 (3d Dep't
1937) (compensation granted for fatal accident of a minor employed in violation of
Labor Law § 171, forbidding employment of minors longer than 48 hours a week, and
in violation of Labor Law § 131, conditioning the employment upon the issuance of
proper working papers by public school authorities). "In those jurisdictions which
exclude minors illegally employed from the operation of W. C. L., misrepresentations
concerning their age might, if there is a causal connection between the misrepresentation
and the injury, substantiate their contributory negligence and so defeat their actions.
Acklin Stamping Co. v. Kutz, 98 Ohio St. 61, 120 N. E. 229 (1918).
=
1 Plick v. Toye Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co., 13 La. App. 525, 127 So. 59 (1930)
(to the company's defense that the deceased was employed on his false representation
that he was a white man, 21 years of age, and in possession of a city badge, the court's
answer was that, first, even conceding that the deceased was guilty of fraud, the
contract was not null and void, but only voidable at the option of the employer; and,
second, that "he would still come under the compensation law because of his status as
an employee at the time he was killed." Id. at 530, 127 So. at 63.
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to have accidents than adults? On the other -hand, the policy underlying
workmen's compensation law insists on shifting the cost of all such injuries
to the insurance carrier regardless of the employee's lack of care or his
predisposition to accidents. Barring accidents due to his wilful intention,
the employee's faults, although possibly or even probably traceable some-




In contradistinction to private life, health, and accident insurance,217 social
insurance law does not deny benefits on account of false statements about
facts, however material they may be to the risks inherent in the job. As
just noted, the sound implications of this fundamental difference have been
accepted in the treatment of the misrepresentation problem. In general, 'm8
social insurance law has set up no standards of fitness, health, or morals as
a qualification for coverager 19 Even if the employee spoke the truth about his
tender age, poor health, former jobs, etc., and the employer nevertheless hired
him, the obligation of the insurance carrier, be it a compensation insurance
carrier, the Social Security Board, or a state fund, is not avoided. One
cannot cite pertinent cases for the simple reasoni that the proposition is
too obvious ever to have been contested. Thus, the 'right to compensation
does not depend upon the claimant's statements about his ,age, training,
health, former jobs, or police record, any more than do the rights of his
wife or his children to survivor's benefits, which by social insurance law
216W. C. L. § 10; Matter of Braiter v. Addie Co., 256 App. Div. 882, 9 N. Y. S.
(2d) 280 (3d Dep't 1939), aff'd, 282 N. Y. 326, 26 N. E. (2d) 277 (1940). See Noreen
v. Vogel, 231 N. Y. 317, 322, 132 N. E. 102, 104 (1921), cited supra note 209. The
question of the employer's personal liability for a double award presents a quite different
issue. The employer may be tricked by the pretenses of the applicant -concerning his
full age, because of the applicant's appearance. Thus, pursuant to W. C. L., § 14a (3),
if his statement were true, a certificate would neither be required nor obtainable, so
it may be argued that no additional award should be imposed upon the employer.
Michigan courts have so construed a similar provision. Boschaw v. Newsberry, 259
Mich. 333, 243 N. W. 46 (1932). In New York section 14a of W. C. L. has been
construed not to subject the employer to the increased compensation simply because he
failed to investigate the applicant's age, provided that the minor's employment in thatjob was not forbidden by the labor statute. Matter of Tesar v. National Ventilating
Co., 227 App. Div. 333, 237 N. Y. Supp. 488 (3d Dep't 1929).
217N. Y. INs. LAw (McKinney, Supp. 1942) §§ 142 (3), 149 (4) (misrepresenta-
tions concerning previous medical treatment, consultation or observation in life, acci-
dent or health insurance).2'8The only two exceptions are W. C. L. § 43 (excluding compensation for an
occupational disease because of false representations as to previous suffering from a
disease of the kind in issue) and W. C. L. § 69 (similar provision as to dust diseases).219Madden's Case, 22 Mass. 487, 111 N. E. 379 (1916) (pre-existing weak heart
condition held not to affect claim) ; Matter of Connolly v. Samaritan Hospital, 259 N. Y.
137, 181 N. E. 76 (1932) (pre-existent cardiac condition held immaterial to claim based
upon a fall caused by that condition) ; Cooke v. Cooke & Cole SilkCo., 19 N. J. Misc.




accrue upon 'his death, depend upon such things. In either case the fact
of employment is the thing which counts and not a supposition that a correct
statement would have led the employer to reject the applicant.
From a strict, legal point of view, a serious problem is raised where the
fraud concerns the identity of the employee, as distinguished from his age
or health. Since in an employment contract the person of the contracting
party is of the essence, a mistake of identity shows a lack of consent. Under
such circumstances, no employment contract comes into existence. However,
no case either in compensation law or in social insurance law is reported
which raises the problem. There is one case which arose under the Employ-
ers' Liability Act. The evidence showed the applicant for the job had been
originally rejected for physical reasons, filed an application under another
name, and had a friend impersonate him at the physical examination upon
the outcome of which the employment was contingent.220 The public interest
in the safety of railroad operations might have given some support to the
holding that the employm ent was void. Yet, is it not stretching the doctrine
of error in persona to tlhe breaking point to subsume the instant case under
that category of error? These remarks suggest, also, that to rest the coverage
upon the legal concept of an employment contract instead of the very fact
of work being performed, is to narrow its objective.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have completed our investigation of how compensation insurance
actually works. We saw that in general the practical results reached by the
agencies and courts stood the test of correctness and soundness. It is true
that they have not always been particularly scientific in the proper demarca-
22OMinneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. v. Rock, 279 U. S. 410, 49 Sup.
Ct. 363 (1928) (action dismissed). See Notes (1929) 43 Hav. .L. REv. 141, (1930) 28
MIcH. L. Rv. 357, (1930) 14 MINN. L. REv. 98, which indicate the dissatisfaction
which the decision provoked by its emphasis upon the public policy of the statutes
requiring common carriers to adopt safety measures for the protection of the public.
None of the notes rationalize the result upon the basis of the non-existence of an
employment relationship. In the Rock case, supra, the defendant company knew nothing
of the plaintiff and never intended to deal with him. In Maslin v. Columbian Nat'l Life
Ins., 3 F. Supp. 368 (D. C. 1932) a life insurance policy procured by impersonation
of another person in the physical examination was held not to be a contract. Accord,
Morgan Munitions Co. v. Studebaker Co., 226 N. Y. 94, 123 N. E. 146 (1919);
RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTS (1936) § 475, ill. 5. This element of identification distin-
guishes the instant case from Ganga v. Ford Motor qo., 250 Mich. 247, 230 N. W.
159 (1930). There claimant, a minor, aware of the fact that the company intended to
employ its "former" employees, applied for a job under the name of his older brother
who had been employed previously, and was hired. Only the name of the employee
was mistaken; his physical appearance was not in doubt. See also Note (1930) 30
COL. L. REv. 1076.
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tion of that field. However, this is not their fault. It is primarily the task
of our science to scrutinize new legal relationships and to examine whether
the scope of a rule operative in other relationships, apparently cognate to
the new ones, might be extended to them. If not, a new classification will
prove itself helpful in avoiding misconstructions and impractical solutions.
When, about a generation ago, the first workmen's compensation acts made
their appearance in this country, their fascination for a profession imbued
with the 19th century tort doctrines rested upon the excision 6f the defenses
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk from actions for indus-
trial injuries. In this vein, an eminent law professor denied that the insur-
ance feature was the most important point of compensation law, even in a
country of the ipso-jure insurance pattern, and made a criticism touched
with irony of the stress laid upon that feature by stating that it has "naturally
been emphasized by laymen."'221 However, as has sometimes been the case
with new juristic phenomena (for instance, with collective bargaining con-
tracts), so, here, the layman's creative imagination seems to have outstripped
that of lawyers always restrained by their so-called "natural" penchant for
the past. It is probable that the aversion of the profession at that time to
the study of statutory law contributed to the attitude of indifference toward
the practice of the new subject. 2 2 Consequently, throughout the past age,
the law students, who were to become the rank and file of the profession,
having seen only a scanty treatment, if any, of a small portion of compensa-
tion law as an appendant to the law of torts, accepted the disclaimer as a
foregone conclusion. There are a very few exceptions. On the whole, that
reserved attitude inured to the benefit of non-lawyers who have not hesitated,
of course, to preempt that field. It was one of the objectives of this paper
to point to the abundance of purely legal questions inherent in the particular
form of compensation insurance as a result of its connection with private
insurance companies.
This is no attempt to summarize the analysis set forth on the foregoing
pages. In view of the many points which had to be discussed, a summary
would necessarily involve much duplication. Some suggestions derived from
the general theme running through the particulars may perhaps help to
round out the presentation. By way of contrast and by way of comparison,
this study, on the one hand, drew a sharp distinction between compensation
221Wambaugh, Workinen-s Compensation Acts:' Their Theory and Their Constitit-
tionality (1912) 25 HARv. L. REv. 129, 131.222For an admirable criticism of the indifference, "if not contempt," evinced by the




insurance and (private) liability or accident insurance, and, on the other hand,
suggested ' definition of the concepts of compensation insurance in the light
of social insurance law. Their sociological and economic affinity is obvious. To
show that there is such affinity not only in their administration but also in
their lekal structure, and that occasionally the protections supplied by either
of them overlap one another, is a lesson we have learned. This is more
apparent when co-erage for compensation insurance arises ipso facto with
the employmoent, as in old age and survivor's insurance and unemployment
insurance. The legislative acts occupying those fields can easily be regarded
as being in simili if not in pari imateria. Yet, even where compensation
insurance covers the employment only after a transaction, we perceived that
its incidents, so far as the coverage of the employee was concerned, were
not different from those produced by the insurance laws of the self-acting
pattern. Certainly, it is not until the employer insures the compensation
risk that the legal structure of protection for the employee by the former
type corresponds exactly with that of the automatic system. Thus, upon
the writing of the insurance, the construction given the law brushes aside
any respect for the contractual element. Whatever the contractual aspect
of the insurance relationship could disclose to the contrary, the practice of
-the law renders the claims no less defense-proof than they are under the
other system against objections based upon failings, if not breaches, in the
employer-insurer relationship. Specifically, one cannot concede any particu-
lar difference between the two types in the eclipse of the powers of the
doctrines of misrepresentation and fraud, waiver and estoppel, warranties
and conditions, the'most notable rulers in the realm of private insurance law.
Nevertheless, there still remains the possibility that by the termination of
the contract with service of the notice upon the commissioner and after
expiration of a certain period, the coverage is lost unless and until the
employer has obtained another policy. This is one of the constitutional de-
fects of the contractual system. On the other hand, one must realize that
the existence of ipso-jure insurance by no means warrants the continuity of
coverage during the period of employment. Where the number of employees,
for instance, is determinative for insurance, the duration of coverage may end
upon the employer's cutting down his staff below the minimum. Nothing
short of placing all the wage earners under a compulsory insurance system
geared to automatism could eliminate the last opportunity for the exercise
of an employer's volition. For the present purposes, it is not necessary to
expatiate on the difference between the scope left to the exercise of employ-
ers' volition in the 1resent ipso-jure insurance and the scope left in the other
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type. As we observed, the difference boils down to one in degree rather
than in substance, so that it may sink into insignificance by increasing both
administrative control over the employer's compliance with the legal obliga-
tion to continue carrying insurance, and the control over a fhir adjustment of
claims. 22
3
As one views the notes and comments on the various problems of com-
pensation law in the legal periodicals, one can hardly escape the impression
that questions revolving around the concept of employment, the causal con-
nection between employment and injury, the recovery against the common-
law tortfeasor, and other topics related to the "statutory tort" read into
the compensation acts, have stimulated discussion. However, there has been
no attempt to create a new formulation of the insurance relationship between
insurance carriers and employees and their dependents. Becoming aware of
the striking differences between the old field of insurance law and the new
field of compensation insurance, one may question the propriety of carrying
over methods utilized in the old field, treated more or less as a matter of
private law, into the new. There is need for both a critical examination of
that ready-made approach and a search for a new method appropriate to
the subject.
In the latter regard, the advent of old age, survivor's and unemployment
insurance law in recent years has produced an analogue which, in planning
for a unification of the administration of social insurance, will have to be
taken into account. While differing in the kind of relief offered, the three
branches of social insurance all aim at protection against the risk of the
loss or the impairment of earning power, hazards inherent in the wage
earner's position in an industrial society.
2 2 3 See Section IV supra. By the Beveridge social security plan, workmen's com-
pensation is to be unified in one system, with private insurance companies to be excluded.
See Professor Laski's article, N. Y. Times, December 6, 1942, p. 18.
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